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The past several decades have seen cities,1 reinvigorated by increased growth and political
will, emerging as progressive forces in a number of areas. The urban portfolio often includes
measures focused on environmental protection, and environmental advocates and scholars have
been vocal in their support for this new wave of local environmentalism. This trend has been
countered by a rising division between state and local populations on social issues. In a number of
states, however, local legislation addressing issues such as sexual orientation and gender, minimum
wage, and environmental protection has provoked state legislators to pass statutes that explicitly
remove certain policy options from local authority. These state measures invalidate local laws
passed, in most cases, pursuant to the localities’ home rule authority.
At first glance, the framework for distribution of state and local power in the United States
presents no barrier to this kind of state action. Localities have historically operated under the
umbrella of the state, and are vested with only those powers specifically delegated to them. To
loosen the strictures of this approach, throughout the twentieth century most states adopted home
rule provisions. These provisions, although highly varied, were in general designed to allow localities
to solve urban issues creatively, and avoid state determination of local matters. The home rule
doctrine therefore allocates to localities a certain degree of authority. In all home rule states,
however, that power is generally subject to override by the state upon assertion of a state interest, or
the passage of general state legislation that conflicts with the local measure.
While the ability of the state to counteract local laws is very strong, assertions of state power
have at times received pushback from courts. This is particularly the case when certain categories of
local legislation, or impacts on constitutional rights, are at issue. Such checks on state power

This Article uses “cities,” “localities,” and “local government,” interchangeably, and encompasses local governments of
various sizes and population characteristics. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Two—Localism and Legal Theory, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 346, 346-49 (1990) (discussing the ways in which the term “city” can be used and construed in academic
literature). While most of the examples of the kinds of local action discussed come from major metropolitan areas, the
analysis applies equally to all subdivisions of the state.
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constrain legislative allocations of burdens and benefits, and make clear that there are boundaries to
state ability to take back authority from localities. These frameworks do not apply well, however, to
state measures that bar certain kinds of local environmental action. The lack of fit between these
approaches and environmental laws leaves local control over environmental issues unprotected from
even the most basic checks on state authority. As a result, the sphere of local autonomy carved out
by home rule is particularly easy to undermine in the environmental context.
There has a growing conversation about the potential for local action on environmental
issues.2 There has also been much discussion of preemption as it relates to local lawmaking,3 and of
the limitations on city authority in the face of state action.4 These two camps have not yet been fully
reconciled, however; advocates for local action often fail to acknowledge the real limits on local
power under the home rule framework, while local government scholars tend to accept those limits
as inevitable. Because defining the proper sphere of local authority goes to the very heart of the
home rule doctrine, the inapplicability of these protections to a specific kind of law warrants
attention to a judicial or legislative fix. This Article attempts to bridge the gap between these
positions by acknowledging the constraints of home rule while envisioning a way forward for local
environmental laws.

See generally, e.g., GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY,
EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS, Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia E. Salkin, eds., ABA Press, Section of State and Local
Government Law (2012); see also, e.g., John R. Nolon, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE LAW:
STANDING GROUND 261-95 (ELI Press 2014); Brian Stone, Jr., THE CITY AND THE COMING CLIMATE: CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE PLACES WE LIVE 97-126, Cambridge University Press (2012).
3 To the extent that state authority over categories of local environmental laws has been discussed to date, it has
generally occurred in the context of natural gas drilling, often through the lens of implied preemption. Because of the
unique state role in oil and gas production, fracking regulations at the local level may require a different kind of inquiry.
For that reason, this scholarship and case law, while contributing to a background understanding of state rejection of
local measures, are unlikely to be directly relevant. Similarly, this Article does not discuss issues of implied preemption.
At the core of this discussion is intentional, express preemption of local laws by state legislatures, and the extent to
which home rule does or could offer some checks on that kind of preemption.
4 Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111 (2015) (exploring the
potential for federal authority to be exercised in support of local laws); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: FederalLocal Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 987-89 (2007).
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A potential solution may be available in the form of protections for the environment that
exist in some state constitutions and the public trust doctrine. Where state constitutions protect a
degree of environmental quality, that constitutional value may not be undermined by state action.
And even where that right is not manifested in a specific constitutional guarantee, background
public trust principles may establish the state and its localities as custodians of the environment for
their citizens. Such principles could in turn inspire and enable judges to push back on reactive
targeting of local measures by the state where the result is a net loss of environmental protection.
This kind of judicial skepticism of state action, while open-ended in nature, is not unprecedented; a
similar defense of local experimentation in support of citizens’ rights has been seen in decisions by
the Supreme Court and others in response to a variety of restrictive state actions that intrude on
principles of local control or infringe on constitutional rights. This Article suggests ways in which
judges could similarly apply environmental protections and principles in evaluating state action.
Certainly, there are many debates to be had about the merits of home rule and the
decisionmaker best-suited to make policy for various topics. The trouble with many arguments that
advocate for one level of government over another is that they have a tendency to take potentially
short-sighted positions for the sake of an ideological victory. Fifteen years ago, many environmental
advocates railed against local control as responsible for suburban sprawl and attendant
environmental damage, and urged state or regional control of land use issues. Substantive principles
located in state constitutional provisions and the public trust doctrine may, however, be able to offer
an environmental lodestar for state and local governments alike.
Today, given the political realities of the country, and that innovative environmental
protections may currently be more likely to occur at the local level than any other, preservation of
the possibility for environmental action within this realm of authority is important. Whether states’
preemption authority includes an ability to dismantle local environmental and other policies through
3

targeted prohibitions will have potentially far-reaching consequences. If cities are to continue their
important work as leaders with regard to climate change adaptation and mitigation, transportation
initiatives, pollution reduction, and many other issues, the prospect of states outlawing local policy
responses one at a time is concerning. Modifying the lens through which state revocation of
authority over certain categories of environmental policy is viewed will advance the interests of cities
in making environmental progress at the local level.
*

*

*

*

*

Part I of the Article addresses recent trends toward local environmental policymaking. Part
II discusses the contours of home rule authority and the power dynamic between state and local
governments. Part III provides examples of how state preemption of local environmental action
might be effected under this framework, looking in particular at statewide bans on local plastic bag
bans. Part IV offers a description of some exceptions to the typical home rule framework, and
discusses why those exceptions tend not to apply to the environmental context. This discussion
suggests, however, that courts may be able to rely on other means, including underlying principles of
state constitutional or common law, to provide for greater protection of local governments in the
face of reactive, piecemeal state legislation targeting local environmental measures.
I.

Cities and Progressive Politics
The past several decades in the United States have seen a revitalization of the urban core in

many cities around the country.5 These changes have resulted in shifts in the political and cultural
sphere.6 Following the suburban boom of the 1950s and 1960s, and the ensuing urban fiscal and
law enforcement problems of the 1970s and 1980s,7 a number of cities have seen a resurgence in

See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, The Rebirth of the Neighborhood, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1595 (2013).
Cf. Parag Khanna, “A New Map for America,” The New York Times, Sunday Review, Opinion (April 15, 2016)
(positing that “America is . . . headed toward a metropolis-first arrangement”).
7 For a general description of these issues, see, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Detroit and the Decline of Urban America, 2013 Mich St.
L. Rev. 1547 (2013).
5
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activity and population, complete with newly desirable real estate, investment, and employment
opportunities. Along with this growth has come increased local political will, from populations that
are often more progressive than their less urban counterparts,8 and both the need and desire for
local governments to engage in extensive policymaking. Invested with the funding and political
capital needed to advance major initiatives, local authorities are acting on a number of issues. This
kind of urban experimentation by localities is important; local lawmaking can act as a “catalyst for
change,”9 is well-suited to address a range of problems because of its flexible nature,10 and can
overcome barriers to progress faced at the state or national level.11 The sheer number of local
governments makes them an important force; “if the fifty states are laboratories for public policy
formation, then surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide logarithmically more
opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and reform.”12
Environmental issues are one area in which the trend toward local policymaking has been
taking hold. “[C]ities have been at the forefront of environmental activism for a long time,”13 and
have long innovated with regard to local solutions to environmental problems.14 And with the
recent rise in city populations and increased political activism, local governments are now leading
with respect to policymaking in the environmental realm on issues such as transit and development

See, e.g., Josh Kron, “Red State, Blue City: How the Urban-Rural Divide Is Splitting America,” The Atlantic (Nov. 30,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-issplitting-america/265686/ (noting that “virtually every major city (100,000-plus population) in the United States of
America has a different outlook from the less populous areas that are closest to it”).
9 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1113 (2007).
10 John R. Nolon, In Praise of Pariochialism: the Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 399 (2002).
11 See Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 87, 107-08
(2012).
12 Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 Urb. Law. 253, 259 (2004). This view of local
innovation is, however, not uncontested. See generally, e.g., Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy
Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 Emory L.J. 1333 (2009) (concluding, after empirical study, that local government
may produce a lower than optimal level of innovation).
13 Dorceta E. Taylor, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE PEOPLE IN AMERICAN CITIES, 1600S-1900S: DISORDER,
INEQUALITY, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 502, Duke University Press: Durham (2009) (describing efforts by cities over several
centuries focused on issues such as clean water, clean air, waste disposal, preservation of open space, and others).
14 Ian Douglas, CITIES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 309, I.B. Tauris (2013).
8
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strategies, climate mitigation and adaptation, toxics reform, and other subjects.15 As cities grow,
ecological challenges become intertwined with urban problems, and the development of more
sustainable cities is essential.16
The call for local power over environmental issues is not necessarily an intuitive one. Local
decisionmaking over environmental issues has often been decried as unsound policy, given cities’ attimes parochial conduct in thwarting efforts to solve environmental problems, such as sprawl
development.17 Externalities inherent in many environmental problems have led many to advocate
for centralized decisionmaking—to nationalize, or even internationalize, environmental policy.18
Greater resources and expertise at higher levels of government may also make environmental
lawmaking more successful.19 There exist, however, environmental issues of uniquely local impact
and importance.20 Moreover, given the current political climate, localities may be the only realistic

See, e.g., Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1113 (2015); see
also Sarah Krakoff, Planetarian Identity Formation and the Relocalization of Environmental Law, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 87, 89 (2012)
(“Local food, local work, local energy production—all are hallmarks of a resurgence of localism throughout
contemporary environmental thought and action”); John Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: the Advent of Local Environmental
Law, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365, 365 (2002) (noting a “remarkable and unnoticed trend among local governments to
adopt laws that protect natural resources”).
16 See, e.g., Introduction (2010). [Online]. In N Cohen (ed.). Green cities: An A-to-Z guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications. Available from:
https://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/greencities/introduct
ion/0 [Accessed 14 June 2016]; see also Jeanette Sadik-Khan & Seth Solomon, Street Fight: Handbook for an Urban
Revolution 24, Viking Press: New York (2016) (noting that the national urban population is expected to grow by 100
million people by 2050, and that “[a]dding a population nearly the equivalent of the nation’s four largest states to cities
and their suburbs could easily exhaust their [ability to provide services to their populations] . . . [t]o attract, retain, and
accommodate rising populations, our leaders must rapidly implement strategies that make cities more attractive places to
live while making their infrastructure function more efficiently to meet the growing demand.”)
17 See Jim Rossi, ‘Maladaptive’ Federalism: the Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives, 64 Case Western
Res. L. Rev. 1759, 1761 (2014) (noting that local innovation and control can be suboptimal where it fails to account for
coordination benefits); David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, (2003); David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of
Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 487, 488-89 (1999). Recent developments in urban dynamics make these
predictions less likely, however, and inform the position that on balance, vesting some power in local governments to
make environmentally protective laws is warranted.
18 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961,
1962 (2007) (arguing that subnational action on climate change is ineffective at best, and harmful at worst).
19 See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, “Local climate change law, at 15, in LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW:
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCALITIES, Benjamin J. Richardson, ed., Edward Elgar (2012).
20 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 244
(2000) (noting that “[t]he decentralization of authority over environmental issues “may be an appropriate response to the
fact that environmental problems often tend to be place-specific”).
15
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option for pursuing environmental solutions,21 and “local, multi-stakeholder involvement in
environmental decision making [may be] key to effecting better environmental results.”22 Motivated
by these trends, environmental law scholars and policymakers alike have started to explore “the
positive potential of local governance in addressing a range of contemporary environmental
problems.”23
These urban environmental measures have taken a variety of forms, address a variety of
topics, and occur in cities both large and small. For example, trash collection and recycling have
long been the purview of local governments.24 As urban populations increase, and available land for
trash disposal becomes scarce, the need to reduce trash flow and improve recycling efforts is clear
for cities across the country.25 In response, a number of localities have developed waste reduction
or recycling programs as part of their sustainability portfolios.26 Some of these efforts have taken

See Jim Rossi, ‘Maladaptive’ Federalism: the Structural Barriers to Coordination of State Sustainability Initiatives, 64 Case Western
Res. L. Rev. 1759, 1761 (2014) (theorizing that trend toward local environmental governance is best explained by
“simple pragmatism,” given the relative ease of passing laws at the local level than at the state or federal levels).
22 William A. Shutkin, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 109, MIT Press (2000).
23 Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1113 (2015).
24 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344 (2007) (“[w]aste disposal
is both typically and traditionally a local government function.”); see also, e.g., 7 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 24:246 (3d ed.)
(“Municipal corporations ordinarily may cause, regulate, or directly perform the collection and disposal of garbage and
refuse within their areas”); Ian Douglas, CITIES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 163-181, I.B. Tauris (2013) (describing
history of local measures regarding waste disposal and recycling, from 1900s to present).
25 See, e.g., Megan Backsen, Jack Hornickel, Cradle-to-Cradle: The Elimination of Waste Introduction, 16 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 572
(2015) (“Academics and governments alike continue to view the steady accumulation of garbage as a threat to orderly
life.”); Joan Mullany, POPPING THE PLASTICS QUESTION: PLASTICS RECYCLING AND BANS ON PLASTICS—CONTACTS,
RESOURCES AND LEGISLATION 2, Issue Brief, National League of Cities (1990) (noting that “[t]he management and
disposal of municipal solid waste has become one of the foremost issues facing local elected officials over the past
decade and unfortunately, promises to continue to demand their attention through the end of this century”).
26 See, e.g., City of Cleveland, “Zero Waste,”
http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Government/CityAgencies/OfficeOfSustainability/WasteRe
ductionAndRecycling (“The City saves money and natural resources by decreasing the waste generated through its own
operations and within the larger city limits. This includes both residential and commercial waste reduction and recycling
programs. The City diverts thousands of tons of waste from the landfill each year, saving over $1 million annually
through waste disposal cost avoidance and recycling revenue”); Sustainable Santa Fe Plan 25-27 (Oct. 29, 2008), available
at http://www.santafenm.gov/media/files/Public_Utilities_Environmental_Services/SustainableSFweb.pdf (describing
waste reduction and recycling efforts by Santa Fe); Anna Clark, “Creative Ways Cities Are Pushing Recycling,” NextCity
(Sept. 2, 2014) (describing recycling initiatives in Houston and Detroit).
21
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the form of bans or fees on plastic bags, Styrofoam, and other forms of disposable packaging.27
Such local initiatives may help to reduce, at least in part, the toll on municipal garbage and recycling
processes, and the environment, that plastic bags exact.28 They may also serve as a gateway into
broader environmental engagement for communities.29 To achieve these goals, cities will likely need
to employ command and control measures, such as bans, or market incentives, such as surcharges
on bag use.
Cities are also on the front lines of climate change. Cities may be “both a cause and a
solution to global warming.”30 That is, cities account for a greatly disproportionate percentage of
greenhouse gas emissions, and as city populations increase, emissions will follow.31 But cities may
also be able to employ a variety of strategies that can help to reduce emissions, and to address issues
of sea level rise, energy efficiency, urban resiliency, water use, and others. A number of cities have
realized the long-term planning that will be required in order to prepare for these changes,32 and
have begun to develop policies accordingly.33 For example, many local governments are involved in
siting of renewable energy projects, offering financial incentives to encourage development of

See also, e.g., Stephen Maxwell Reck, The Expanding Environmental Consciousness of Local Government: Municipalities That Have
Banned Styrofoam and the Legal Consequences, 11 U. Bridgeport L. Rev. 127 (1990) (listing cities with bans on styrofoam
packaging).
28 See Adam Sternbergh, “The Fight Over Plastic Bags is About a Lot More Than How to Get Groceries Home,” New
York Magazine (July 15, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/07/plastic-bag-bans.html
29 See Carolyn Flower, “Banning the Bag, Greening the City,” NextCity (July 12, 2012),
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/banning-the-bag-greening-the-city (last visited July 15, 2016).
30 Green Cities: Mayoral Initiatives to Reduce Global Warming Pollution, p. 1, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Energy
Independent and Global Warming, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session (June 19,
2007); see also Patricia E. Salkin, Can You Hear Me Up There? Giving Voice to Local Communities Imperative for Achieving
Sustainability, 4 Envt’l & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 256, 258 (2009) (“voices and actions of local governments are critical to
achieving truly sustainable communities, especially in the climate change arena”).
31 Green Cities: Mayoral Initiatives to Reduce Global Warming Pollution, p. 1, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Energy
Independent and Global Warming, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session (June 19,
2007).
32 See, e.g., Brian Stone, Jr., THE CITY AND THE COMING CLIMATE: CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PLACES WE LIVE 96,
Cambridge University Press (2012) (noting the need for cities to “fundamentally remake themselves to become viable
enterprises” in advance of further shifts in climate).
33 See, e.g., Edward Hart, “8 Creative Ways Cities are Combating Rising Temperatures,” NEW YORK MAGAZINE, The
Urbanist (June 15, 2016), available at http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/06/how-cities-are-combating-risingtemperatures.html
27

8

renewable energy sources, promoting interconnection to the grid to allow consumers to profit from
generation of their own renewable energy, and establishing local renewable portfolio standards that
require a certain percentage of city power to be purchased from renewable sources.34 Security of the
land mass for a city is also critical, and cities have engaged in development of adaptation strategies to
handle phenomena like sea level rise.35 In 2007, New York City developed the first draft of its
PlaNYC portfolio of sustainability measures. That plan is designed to make the city more resilient in
the face of climate change and rising sea levels by strengthening coastline defenses, creating building
standards that will better protect the built environment against severe weather, and improving urban
infrastructure.36 PlaNYC was updated after the damage wrought on the city in 2012 by Hurricane
Sandy made even more apparent the potential dangers for the city of extreme weather and rising sea
levels.37 Localities across the country are developing their own adaptation plans and policies to
address the coming changes.38 These plans are likely to require authority on the part of localities
over a wide array of property, utilities, and many other aspects of local governance.
Finally, transit policy has long shaped cities, for better and for worse. The massive highway
projects of the mid-twentieth century had lasting impacts on cities by bifurcating neighborhoods and
providing a quick conduit in and out of urban areas. In many cities, mass transit was long ago
abandoned in favor of the car, and parking lots cover a high percentage of valuable urban land. As
more people move back into cities, and cities become increasingly interested in more efficient use of
See, e.g., Jessica Reinhardt, “Greening the Grid,” in GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY, EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS 193-209, Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia E. Salkin,
eds., ABA Press, Section of State and Local Government Law (2012).
35 See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, “Local climate change law, at 7, in LOCAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW:
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCALITIES, Benjamin J. Richardson, ed., Edward Elgar (2012)
(“Climate adaptation is innately suited to response at a local level.”).
36 See, e.g., New York City Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/html/resiliency/resiliency.shtml.
37 See generally PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York, The City of New York, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg
(2013), available at http://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/sirr/SIRR_singles_Lo_res.pdf
38 See generally Georgetown Climate Center, “State and Local Adaptation Plans,”
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/plans.html (providing comprehensive set of links to local climate
adaptation plans around the country).
34
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land as well as improvements in air quality, transit policies have received additional attention from
local governments.39 A renewed focus on transit can have profound benefits for urban life,40 as well
as for the environment. The interest of cities in tackling the transportation needs of their citizens
for the coming years can be seen, for instance, in the competition for the United States Department
of Transportation’s Smart Cities Challenge, a $40 million grant to integrate new technology, such as
self-driving cars, into urban transportation infrastructure. And across the country, cities of various
sizes and demographics, such as Kansas City,41 Los Angeles,42 Columbus,43 Providence,44 and many
others, are using new transit policies to convert urban areas shaped by decades of focus on suburbs,
highways, and the personal automobile into those that can better serve their newly invigorated urban
cores. To do that, however, they must have some control over property for use in transit, the ability
to raise needed funds, and the freedom to adjust street and traffic codes,45 among other powers.
These are merely a handful of examples of local environmental problems and solutions that
occur outside the broader network of state and federal environmental regulations. They are critical
to the health of cities, and to the ability of urban areas to adjust to shifting demands. Given the
important role that cities are likely to play in any blueprint for a sustainable future, ensuring that
local leaders are able to make needed changes is essential. Further, as mentioned, cities are, in some

David S. Silverman & Brent O. Denzin, “Green Transportation: Roadblocks and Avenues for Promoting Low-Impact
Transportation Choices,” GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT: LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING SUSTAINABILITY,
EFFICIENCY, AND FISCAL SAVINGS 159, Keith H. Hirokawa & Patricia E. Salkin, eds., American Bar Association (2012).
40 Vukan R. Vuchic, TRANSPORTATION FOR LIVABLE CITIES 7, Center for Urban Policy Research: Rutgers , the State
University of New Jersey (1999) (“A number of elements comprising livability of an area depend, directly or indirectly,
on the type and quality of its transportation system.”)
41 “Kansas City Announces Opening Date of KC Streetcar,” City of Kansas City, Missouri, http://kcmo.gov/streetcar/
42 See, e.g., Janette Sadik-Khan & Seth Solomon, Street Fight: Handbook for an Urban Revolution 68-69, New York:
Viking (2016).
43 “U.S. Department of Transportation Announces Columbus as Winner of Unprecedented $40 Million Smart City
Challenge,” U.S. Department of Transportation (June 23, 2016) (describing plans to use transportation technology to
link parts of the city).
44 “Enhanced Transit Corridor in Downtown Providence,” Office of Mayor Jorge O. Elorza, Providence, Rhode Island
(March 14, 2016), https://www.providenceri.com/mayor/enhanced-transit-corridor-in-downtown-providence
45 See, e.g., Janette Sadik-Khan & Seth Solomon, Street Fight: Handbook for an Urban Revolution 30-31, New York:
Viking (2016) (describing adoption of new urban street design guides).
39
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parts of the country, the only level of government at which innovations in environmental protection
are occurring at the moment. This is not to say that city power will always be directed toward the
good of the ecosystem. But it does mean that clarifying the ways in which substantive law may offer
a means of upholding local power against state intrusions is critical in terms of laying out a plan for
environmental protection.
II.

State and Local Relationship
The rise in urban power has been accompanied by a growing number of substantive policy

conflicts between states and localities. Generally speaking, local governments operate under powers
delegated to them by state governments. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
says that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”46 The lack of mention of local
governments in the Constitution has generally been interpreted to mean that localities’ sole authority
derives from the states. As described in greater detail below, the shape of power conferred upon
local governments has changed over the nation’s history. Today, localities in most states have some
independent sphere of authority within which they can act without express permission from or
action by the state. While operating under those delegated powers, however,47 localities “sometimes
seek to pass laws and regulations that go beyond what their respective state governments desire.”48
In many instances and in many different fields, this has resulted in state governments acting to
remove specific policy outcomes or subject areas from local control via preemption, or in the
explicit removal of certain aspects of home rule authority from local governments. Understanding

U.S. CONST., ART. X.
John Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: the Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 365, 365 (2002).
48 Shannon M. Roesler, Federalism and Local Environmental Regulation, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1111, 1115 (2015).
46
47
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this dynamic is important for an appreciation of the functional power that cities have to effect
change at the local level.49
A. The Evolution of Home Rule
There is a long history of local self-governance in the United States,50 though that has never
meant local independence. While a thorough recounting of state and local relations in the United
States has been discussed in detail elsewhere51 and is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief
description of the relationship will provide some context for the ensuing discussion. Local
independence from the monarchy was a fiercely-asserted right in seventeenth-century England.52
And in colonial America, local governance was the first kind of recognized authority.53 The political
status of early American cities, however, was not entirely settled. In post-revolutionary America, the
question of how best to think about the authority of local governments occupied courts for much of
the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and has continued to be the subject of much debate.54
While the American political structure has always varied from that of England, American
courts seem to have imported the British tradition of thinking of cities as “corporate entit[ies]
intermediate between the state and the individual.”55 As a result, “the legal system in America
formulated the rights of cities in the process of establishing the general relationship between

See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: the Politics of City Status in American
Law, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83, 152 (1986).
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corporations and the state.”56 Until the early nineteenth century, American courts tended to treat
cities and private corporations in the same way, and these entities often had similar powers.57 Then,
in 1819, the United States Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.58 Trustees of Dartmouth College created a formal distinction between private and public
corporations. The former, as the province of private citizens, had property rights that had to be
protected against state intrusion; the latter, founded by the government, required no such
protection.59 Following that decision, a leading early treatise developed a theory that “public
corporations . . . are invested with subordinate legislative powers . . . and such powers are subject to
the control of the legislature of the state.”60 The characterization of cities as public corporations
subordinate to the state became widespread, retaining protections against state intrusion only for
private property.61 This shift, which ran contrary to much of the history of state and local relations,
“turned the political world as it then existed upside down.”62
For some time, this theory of local subordination to state control went untested. An
increase in city functions during the mid-nineteenth century, however, prompted new debates over
the proper relationship of city to state. One theory of how best to allocate power between the two
entities was advanced by Judge Thomas M. Cooley, who authored an 1868 treatise in which he
stated that “the sovereign people had delegated only part of their sovereignty to the states,” and had
“preserved the remainder for themselves in written and unwritten constitutional limitations on
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governmental actions.”63 One of those important limitations was “the people’s right to local selfgovernment.”64 A formulation directly contrary to Cooley’s position, however, soon appeared in an
1872 treatise by Judge John F. Dillon. In his treatise, Dillon argued that democratic goals of
governance and avoidance of special interests were best accomplished through state legislative
control of cities.65 He stated this view in broad terms by noting that state power “is supreme and
transcendent: it may erect, change, divide, and even abolish, at pleasure, as it deems the public good
to require,” and that courts have a duty to require local governments to “show a plain and clear
grant for the authority they assume to exercise . . . .”66 Dillon’s views appear to have been based on
an “expectation that state and judicial control would help ensure the attainment by cities of an
unselfish public good,”67 as well as on his own ties to corporate actors interested in state control.68
“Dillon’s Rule” was eventually adopted nationwide, possibly influenced by negative views of cities
that painted them as “the home of mobs, foreigners, racial minorities, and sinners,”69 a threat to
national unity,70 and “islands of private parochialism.”71 Its broad acceptance meant that localities
could operate pursuant only to specific grants of power from the state legislature. The Rule did not
dictate how much power should be delegated to localities, but it vested the source of that power
squarely with the state.72
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Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, localities were heavily dependent on the states.
Local governments could take no action on any issue without an explicit grant of authority from the
state legislature. The inherent limitations of this approach became apparent during the late 1800s
and early 1900s, as cities began to expand rapidly for the first time in the United States. Growing
urban populations gave rise to health concerns, crime, and need for land use controls, and local
populations demanded action on these issues. It became increasingly clear that cities faced a
number of unique problems, and that state legislatures were not well-positioned to act swiftly or
knowledgeably on these issues.
Out of these conditions came an idea of governance known as “home rule.” As a general
idea, home rule was intended to establish a sphere within which cities could act on their own
initiative, without specific grants of authority. Home rule provides, in short, a “legal means to
decentralize power to the local level.”73 Advocates for home rule were motivated by “a Progressive
era concern with the limited scope and capacity of municipal governments in the state constitutional
system.”74 Home rule was also designed to combat the dangers of state control that had been
evidenced in targeted special legislation, which interfered with appropriate city governance.75 Thus,
the two underlying goals of the home rule movement were (1) to give cities a degree of initiative in
city affairs based on a more general grant of authority from the state, and (2) to “give cities an area
of autonomy immune from state control, even by general legislation.”76 “In contrast to a Dillon’s
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Rule regime that presumes city powerlessness, home rule provides presumptive city authority to
engage in a wide variety of governmental activities.”77 Early conceptions of home rule took a variety
of forms and justifications,78 and may have been motivated more by the cause of “good
government” than local independence for its own sake.79 At a basic level, however, these ideas
incorporated some of Thomas Cooley’s ideas of local power and independence.80 Running through
all of these home rule proposals was an understanding that a degree of local decisionmaking, secure
from state authority, was necessary to allow improved visions of city government to take shape.
In 1875, Missouri became the first state to include a home rule provision in its constitution,81
and it was followed by many others. Today, nearly all states have something akin to home rule,
although grants of local power take many forms.82 Most broadly, home rule provisions come in
either constitutional or statutory form,83 named according to the legal form in which the home rule
protections are packaged. The constitutional home rule framework predominated at the turn of the
twentieth century. Under this scheme, the state constitution carves out a sphere of local authority,
free of state interference over matters of local significance.84 Because of difficulties in defining the
local sphere, state legislatures began to shift in the mid-twentieth century to statutory grants that
gave localities a certain degree of authority, provided that the exercise of local power did not conflict
Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1109, 1134 (2012).
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with any state laws. While scholars have found it difficult to calculate with precision the number of
constitutional versus legislative home rule states, the majority of states now employ the legislative
approach.85 For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to say that, under any system, the most
relevant inquiries for the home rule framework when it comes to state override of local authority are
the extent of the state versus local interest, and the existence of “general,” versus “special,”
conflicting state laws.
Certainly, the grant of home rule powers to cities around the country did not result in their
independence; while “local governments may have gained some measure of power and formal
autonomy in the state-local relationship,”86 they remain largely subject to the control of the state
legislature.87 But the various home rule provisions did result in the conferral of a certain range of
powers upon localities under which they could operate.88 This power encompasses both selfgovernance and police powers,89 the latter of which includes the authority to address environmental
harms.90 Vesting local governments with this sphere of authority reflected the broader goals of
providing greater freedom to local governments,91 eliminating particularized state control over
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localities,92 and creating greater accountability in the state legislature for the relationship between
state and local governments.93
B. Home Rule Analysis
As noted, the extent of state powers varies under different home rule frameworks. While
there may be as many formulations of home rule as there are states that employ it,94 it can be broken
down generally into the aforementioned two categories, based on whether home rule powers are
created by state constitution or statute. Under either framework, state legislators desiring to
preempt local action have a great deal of authority to do so.
a. Constitutional Grants and State Interest
Early state constitutional grants are often characterized as taking an “imperium in
imperio”—state within a state—approach to home rule authority.95 These early grants were typified
by the creation of a separate sphere of local authority within which cities could legislate, free from
state interference.96 In some states, the determination of this sphere took the form of a list of items
deemed to be of “local” interest;97 in others, there was not a specific list, but a more general grant of
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power to local governments over all issues of local concern.98 Thus, in such states, the definition of
a “state interest” is crucial to any determination of the proper scope of home rule authority.99 The
boundary lines between state and local interests were not easily drawn, however. And even when
grants of authority were specific, the extent of local authority in the face of conflicting state laws
remained in flux. When state and local laws conflict, courts may permit the state legislature to
“enact a law in a functional area provided there is a substantial state concern,” even where it intrudes
on the sphere carved out for local authority.100 Home rule authority under this framework is
therefore subject to case-by-case determinations that make it difficult for cities to know the precise
extent of their powers.101 Ultimately, courts in most major state-local disputes tend to find “a state
concern and uph[o]ld the state action.”102 In consequence, the so-called imperio approach has been
“relatively ineffective” in carving out a protected sphere of local authority.103
b. Legislative Grants and General Legislation
The difficulties in drawing clear boundaries around a local sphere led many states to begin to
adopt a form of home rule that “provided local government with an area in which to operate freely,
subject to the ultimate purview of the state legislature.”104 This grant of authority, also known as the
“devolution of powers” or the “residual powers” approach,105 is typical in statutory delegations of
home rule authority to local governments. Under this framework, local governments are
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empowered to act in any area, unless explicitly prohibited by state law.106 This approach differs from
Dillon’s Rule, which prevents a local government from exercising a power unless specifically
authorized to do so by the legislature.”107 Local authority may still be altered, however, by general
laws passed by the state.
The use of “general laws” as a limit on state preemption authority incorporates prohibitions
on special legislation found in most state constitutions.108 Under provisions that generally predate
home rule,109 legislatures in most states are required to preference general legislation over special
legislation.110 Special legislation refers to the bestowing of particular benefits or prohibitions on
individual cities. Broadly speaking, laws are “general” when they apply to all cities in a state, or all
cities within a particular classification based on size or other characteristics.111 Whatever the
classification, a general law must “apply equally to each member” of the class, and cannot exempt
specific members.112 The widespread prohibition on special legislation arose out of concerns around
the turn of the twentieth century regarding the dominance of state legislative authority and the
targeting of legislation toward individual municipalities and persons. Arguments against special
legislation ranged from legislative meddling in local affairs to facilitation of corruption.113 These
special legislation clauses were designed to inhibit the ability of state governments to reward or
penalize specific entities, and to strengthen local governments.114 The statutory home rule approach

See, e.g., Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 12, Washington DC: CQ Press
(2001).
107 See, e.g., Joseph F. Zimmerman, State-Local Relations: A Partnership Approach 27, Westport: Praeger (1995).
108 Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 264-65 (2000).
109 Neil Littlefield, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 9, Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co.,
Inc. (1985).
110 Nadav Shoked, Quasi-Cities, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1971, 1983 (2013); John M. Winters, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS 85, Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (1986).
111 John M. Winters, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS 85,
Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (1986).
112 Id. at 104.
113 Gerald E. Frug, Richard T. Ford & David J. Barron, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 159-160 (4th ed.), American
Casebook Series, ThomsonWest (2006).
114 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 265
(2000).
106

20

incorporates these prohibitions by stating that local laws are preempted only by general laws at the
state level. In this way, negative measures designed to prevent arbitrary interference by the state
legislature were woven into more positive grants of local authority.115 Under this framework, the
proper scope of local authority in the face of a state enactment may therefore depend in large part
on whether that state law is deemed “general” or “special.”
III.

State Override of Local Environmental Measures
This organizational structure means that local governments generally derive sufficient

authority from either home rule grants or underlying police power to allow them to take action to
protect the local environment.116 Thus, the question of whether local governments have the
authority to act in the first instance is fairly settled. As cities assert their independence in a variety of
policy spheres,117 however, the exercise of that power has caused a number of localities to come into
conflict with the state. This is particularly evident in the environmental context; “states, in addition
to being sites of innovation and flexibility and pragmatism, are sites of environmental conflicts quite
as intense as those at the federal level.”118
One example of localities taking different stances on environmental issues than their states is
in the area of climate change. Cities have taken an active role in advocating for action in this arena.
For instance, the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement was launched on February 16, 2005,
the day that the Kyoto Protocol went into effect, and was intended as a response to federal inaction
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on climate change and failure to ratify the Protocol.119 That Agreement specifically lists a number of
actions that mayors may take to meet or exceed the Protocol goals in their cities.120 Similar views
have given rise to a conflict between state and local governments over the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan, where 26 state attorneys general have filed suit against EPA, but
the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and numerous individual cities are
participating as amici in support of EPA’s plan.121 On these issues, some cities have staked out policy
and litigation stances independent of their parent states. Such actions do not constitute local laws,
and they may be less susceptible to undermining via state intervention. But in response to similar
conflicts that have manifested in environmental lawmaking on the part of local governments,122
states have acted to revoke authority from localities on the issues in question.
One explanation for the rise of these state and local dynamics may be the intertwining of
conservative politics and animus toward environmental protections.123 The influence of partisan
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politics on the state and local relationship has long been an American reality.124 In parts of the
country with a more conservative statewide bent, cities are often more amenable—and potentially
more in need—of environmental regulation. When cities attempt to act out those goals of the urban
populace, state lawmakers may work to reject this kind of policymaking in their states. Another
explanation is the success of business interests at the state level, and corporate interests that value
uniform standards over local innovation.125
Whatever the motivation, removal of local authority to act on environmental issues has
become a risk for local governments acting to exercise independent authority. Unlike conflicts
between the federal and state governments, strongly articulated principles of federalism do not
advocate in favor of one body versus another. Instead, states can accomplish the alteration of local
power in a number of ways, without implicating in most cases larger principles of allocation of
power. States may, for instance, pass their own regulatory schemes that take over the field. In such
cases, even when a state legislature does not explicitly state its intent to do away with local laws,
passage of the state scheme will often be sufficient to impliedly preempt any separate local action.
States may also expressly declare their intent to preempt local laws when establishing a
comprehensive—or quasi-comprehensive—set of rules governing an issue. Finally, and most
relevant here, states can pass a law that does nothing more than remove local power over a certain
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issue. All of these state actions reflect attempts to alter the authority that would otherwise be
enjoyed by local governments under the home rule framework.
A.

Types of State Action
1.

Implied Removal of Local Authority

Much of the discussion on state control over local environmental authority to date has
focused on the ways in which courts assess whether a local regulation conflicts with, and is
preempted by, state law.126 Such preemption can occur in several ways. First, it may be an implied
consequence of state action on a particular subject. The Supreme Court and others have recognized
two forms of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict preemption.127 In the former,
judges may see state occupancy of a field as eliminating local authority to act on related issues. “The
more pervasively and thoroughly the legislature has regulated a field, the argument goes, the more
likely it is that the state legislature ‘intended’ to completely occupy that field and not allow for local
regulation, even if the legislature never expressly declared such an intent.”128
The other kind of implied preemption is known as conflict preemption. The conflict
preemption analysis can be further divided into “physical impossibility” and “obstacle” categories.129
The physical impossibility test is limited to those cases “in which it would be literally impossible for
someone to comply with both statutes;”130 stated another way, the question is whether a local
ordinance “permits an act prohibited by a statute or prohibits an act permitted by a statute.”131 If
state law is construed to permit everything not prohibited, then the possibility for preemption of

See, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 966-975 (2015); Paul
Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1126-27 (2007).
127 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
128 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1153 (2007).
129 Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 131, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009).
130 Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 131, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009).
131 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1142 (2007).
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local measures under this theory is very strong.132 Even without such a strong interpretation of
conflict, preemption may occur where a state or local measure presents an “obstacle” to achieving
the purposes and objectives of, respectively, the federal or state statute.133
In the environmental context, implied preemption has come up in a number of cases
involving local limits on natural gas extraction accomplished via hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking.”
For instance, in West Virginia, a local fracking ban was found to be preempted by provisions in the
West Virginia Code. The court relied on “the State’s interest in oil and gas development and
production throughout the State” to find that the Code should be interpreted to provide for
exclusive control of oil and gas development by the West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection.134 Colorado courts have also employed an implied preemption analysis to assess whether
local regulations pose “operational conflicts with state objectives.”135 Other courts, including those
in New York and Pennsylvania, have considered local fracking regulations within the context of
existing state oil and gas law, and found that such state laws could not be read to imply total
preemption of the field.136 As a result, local measures regulating some aspects of fracking were
permitted. This kind of implied preemption analysis may be employed whenever arguably relevant
state law operates as a backdrop to a local activity; the precise analysis will vary by state.
2.

Express Removal of Local Authority

Id.
Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 132, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009).
134 Id. at 968 (citing Northeast Natural Energy LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, at * 9 (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011).
135 Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 969 (2015); City of Longmont
Colorado, et al. v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, et al., 2016 Colo. 29 (Sup. Ct. Colo.) (finding an “operational conflict”
between city fracking bans and applicable state law, and therefore finding city ban preempted and unenforceable).
136 Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 966-68, 970-71 (2015) (discussing
Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 23 N.Y.3d 728 (N.Y. 2014) and Huntley & Huntley v. Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855 (Pa.
2009)).
132
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State removal of local authority may also come much more directly, in two different ways.
First, express preemption of local authority may be accomplished through state legislation on a
subject that includes a clause expressly preempting local authority to regulate in the area. 137
Although courts may again engage in various interpretations of legislative intent when confronted
with apparently express preemption,138 “[i]t is well established that within constitutional limits
Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in express terms.”139 The same is true of state
legislatures. Thus, a state may preempt local laws by regulating in the same field as a local
government, and noting its intent to preempt local authority. Second, and distinctly, states may
enact legislation explicitly aimed at circumscribing the grant of home rule power with regard to a
particular issue. Such laws do not establish state law in the area, but instead function only to remove
local authority to regulate on the topic in question.140 This kind of removal of local authority does
not implicate preemption doctrine, but rather gets to the heart of home rule authority. Express
removal of authority can take either of these forms, or may be a hybrid of the two.141
The focus of this Article is on those instances where the explicit removal of local authority is
the sole or primary function of the state legislation. It therefore does not undermine the analysis
here to concede that where a state has a long history of regulation in an area that would rise to the

Indeed, some state courts require an express statement of intent to preempt before any such preemption will be
found. See, e.g., Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy Sector, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 927, 968, 983 (2015)
(describing New York and Kansas state courts as “avoiding intrastate preemption absent express legislative intent”).
138 Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine 122-24, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW,
AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION, William Buzbee, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press (2009)
(describing interpretive principles related to express preemption).
139 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
140 See, e.g., Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil is King, Fordham Law Review (2016) (describing examples of targeted
preemption of local authority to regulate natural gas extraction).
141 See, e.g., Texas House Bill 40 (2014) (House Bill 40 cites the state framework for regulation of oil and gas activities and
notes that “[i]t is in the interest of this state to explicitly confirm the authority to regulate oil and gas operations in this
state. The legislature intends that this Act expressly preempt the regulation of oil and gas operations by municipalities
and other political subdivisions, which is impliedly preempted by the statutes already in effect.” H.B. 40 goes on to
more explicitly remove the authority of local governments to “enact or enforce an ordinance or other measure, or an
amendment or revision of an ordinance or other measure, that bans, limits, or otherwise regulates an oil and gas
operation within the boundaries or extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality or political subdivision.”).
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level of occupation of the field, or passes new, comprehensive regulations, a state law that also
includes an express preemption clause may not be governed by the discussion below. State actors
are generally sophisticated, however, and removal of local authority is almost universally
accompanied by statements of state interest in and occupation of a particular field. Thus, expressly
carving out the framework in this Article from those instances where a state asserts its interest, or
gestures to state laws that do not truly occupy a field, would create an artificial and unhelpful
distinction. We are talking here about explicit removal of local lawmaking authority over particular
matters, where the rules of preemption are inapplicable because of the lack of substantive state
regulation on the subject.
Reactive, targeted elimination of local authority by state legislatures goes beyond the more
typical move of state legislatures that would preempt local laws by establishing statewide schemes of
maximum, minimum, or non-discretionary standards.142 At the core of the new elimination of local
authority appears to be “state decision makers’ suspicions about local decision making,”143 and the
growing prevalence of these state actions may give the lie to arguments advanced by some local
government scholars that “direct state efforts to overturn local governmental decisions are relatively
rare.”144 As partisan splits and views on environmental policy continue to divide the state and local
levels of government, such attempts to stop local action frowned upon by the state may become
more frequent. These state efforts may operate to limit local involvement in environmental law and
policy,145 and to thereby ensure that certain environmental issues are left unaddressed.

See, e.g., Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
237, 268 (2000) (describing state preemption of local laws exclusively in terms of standard-setting).
143 Gerald E. Frug and David J. Barron, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 143, Cornell
University Press: Ithaca (2008).
144 Id. at 33 (characterizing literature of local government scholars such as Richard Briffault that attribute a considerable
amount of power to local governments).
145 Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 237, 238
(2000).
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While far from a new trend,146 the targeted removal of local authority over environmental
and other matters has negative consequences. Such state action can pose a threat to local
innovation147 and ideals of governance, as it “suppresses the interest of municipal citizens to
participate directly in decisionmaking which affects them.”148 Moreover, this state behavior is
contrary to the very goals of the home rule movement. That movement was designed to get away
from piecemeal grants of authorities to localities,149 and the influence of special interests at the state
level. Systematic removal of local authority because states dislike or disagree with local policy
solutions undermines the intention of home rule, as well as citizen involvement and the ability to
work toward a clean environment.150 Using plastic bag bans as an example, the discussion below will
show how the current state of the law may fail to protect against targeted state removal of local
authority over environmental measures.
B. Case Study—Banning Bag Bans

Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 53, Princeton University
Press: Princeton (1999) (“it seems ironic that city powerlessness became firmly established as a legal principle during the
last few decades of the nineteenth century, the period described in Arthur Schlesinger’s seminal history of cities entitled
The Rise of the City. On the other hand, it may not be ironic at all. As Schlesinger argues, urbanization reinforced the felt
need for controls over city power.”)
147 Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1113, 1114 (2007) (“the primary threat to local innovation is the
charge of intrastate preemption”); cf. Dale Krane, et al., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 2, CQ
Press: Washington, DC (2001) (noting that “possessing substantial freedom from state government control is vital for
the development of dynamic communities”).
148 George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 Stetson L. Rev.
643, 644 (1993); see also Rita Barnett-Rose, Judicially Modified Democracy: Court and State Pre-Emption of Local Gmo Regulation in
Hawaii and Beyond, 26 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 71, 105 (2015) (“by finding that the local ordinances were pre-empted by
state and federal law, the district court did make the radical decision to remove local citizen participation in the
democratic process”); David B. Spence, The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 351 (Dec. 2014)(describing
the “long tradition in economics, positive theory, and other quasi-utilitarian traditions of examining jurisdictional
conflicts . . . using the matching principle, which would house regulatory authority at the lowest level of government that
encompasses (geographically) the costs and benefits of the regulated activity”).
149 Cf. Christopher W. Hammons, State Constitutional Reform: Is It Necessary?, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1327, 1347 n.122 (2001)
(noting that, in New York, “[t]he Citizen's Union argued for greater home rule for cities, and suggested that the
piecemeal amendments adopted between 1894 and 1938 had created much obsolete or partially inapplicable matter in
the state Constitution, which needed to be excised.”); Joni Armstrong Coffey, The Case for Fiscal Home Rule, Fla. B.J.,
APRIL 1997, at 54, 55.
150 Cf. William A. Shutkin, THE LAND THAT COULD BE: ENVIRONMENTALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 128, MIT Press (2000) (noting the importance of “meaningful, informed participation in the
decisionmaking procedures that affect the quality of people’s lives” for civic democratic practice and, in turn, civic
environmentalism).
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A more specific example may help to elucidate the type of state action at issue. Plastic bag
bans, and bans on those bag bans, provide a straightforward instance of targeted state preemption of
local measures. This Article will provide a brief background on the ways in which these bans have
been implemented in a number of states. It will then assess how challenges to such state laws would
proceed under a typical home rule analysis.
Briefly, common practice throughout the United States has long been to distribute plastic
bags freely along with any purchase. The waste and pollution that results from the production and
disposal of all of these plastic bags is a matter of concern for many localities.151 In an effort to
discourage use of these bags, a number of municipalities have passed laws mandating that retailers
charge a fee for any plastic bags they hand out; some have banned the use of plastic bags entirely.152
These laws are intended to remedy the pollution of landscape and water attributable to disposal of
plastic bags, prevent that waste from ending up in a landfill, and correct for the difficulty of
recycling this type of material.153 Although there are currently robust debates being had about
whether such bans result in net positive environmental impacts,154 it appears uncontroverted that
cities that have instituted such fines and bans have seen a significant drop in plastic bag use. In
many instances, these fees or bans form part of a larger environmental and sustainability portfolio
for cities.

See, e.g., Chris Gibson, et al., HOUSEHOLD SUSTAINABILITY: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 91-92,
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham (2013).
152 Comprehensive information on these kinds of bans and charges nationwide is available via Novolex, a packaging
company. To use mapping tool to find information on all 50 states, see, e.g., http://www.bagtheban.com/in-your-state.
153 See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Is It Time to Bag the Plastic?,” THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sunday Review (May 18, 2013)
(“plastic bags are the bane of recycling programs;” the bags themselves are very difficult to recycle, and, when placed
into bins with general plastic, the plastic bags “jam and damage expensive sorting machines, which cost huge amounts to
repair.”)
154 See, e.g., Chris Gibson, et al., HOUSEHOLD SUSTAINABILITY: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 94-95,
97-98, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham (2013).
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Bans on plastic are not a new solution,155 nor are they limited to the United States.156 Within
this country, however, some states have responded to local measures by, in essence, banning bag
bans. State action to date has not involved explicit regulation of plastic bags or containers, but has
instead contained only a prohibition on local action. For instance, following a local measure in
Tucson, Arizona that banned the use of plastic bags by local businesses, the state of Arizona passed
a law in 2015 stating that cities and counties may neither “regulate the sale, use, or disposition of
auxiliary containers,” nor “impose a tax, fee, assessment, charge or return deposit” for auxiliary
containers.157 Similarly, after Columbia, Missouri enacted a ban on plastic bags, the state legislature
enacted a measure to prohibit these kinds of local laws. Missouri’s version of a ban on bag bans—
passed over a governor’s veto—states that all merchants doing business in the state “must have the
option to provide customers with a paper or plastic bag for any item or good purchased. A political
subdivision cannot impose any ban, fee, or tax upon the use of paper or plastic bags for packaging
any item or good purchased or prohibit a consumer from using a reusable bag.”158 And Indiana has
passed a law revoking from its grant of home rule “the power to . . . ‘regulate, or adopt or enforce
an ordinance to regulate” the manufacture, distribution, sale, provision, use, or disposition or

See, e.g., Joan Mullany, POPPING THE PLASTICS QUESTION: PLASTICS RECYCLING AND BANS ON PLASTICS—
CONTACTS, RESOURCES AND LEGISLATION 8-12, Issue Brief, National League of Cities (1990) (describing bans on
plastic, Styrofoam, and other products in states and cities around the country).
156 See, e.g., Chris Gibson, et al., HOUSEHOLD SUSTAINABILITY: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 92,
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham (2013) (describing bans on plastic in South Africa, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Italy,
and France).
157 Arizona SB 1241 (2015). After a lawsuit was filed challenging the legitimacy of SB 1241 for, among other things,
violating the title and single-subject mandates in the state constitution, a revised version of the bill was passed in 2016.
See HB 2131, House Summary 3.14.16.
158 Missouri HB 722.
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disposal of auxiliary containers, or impose any prohibition, restriction, fee, or tax with respect to
auxiliary containers.”159 Similar actions have been taken in Wisconsin,160 Idaho,161 and Michigan.162
In Arizona, the statewide ban on plastic bag bans has been challenged in court on a number
of bases, including violation of the state’s home rule doctrine.163 The plaintiff in that lawsuit is a
member of the City Council in Tempe, Arizona; she alleges that the Council in Tempe was prepared
to move forward on a local bag ban, but the process was disrupted by SB 1241.164 No decision has
yet been issued in this case. It may be possible, however, to predict the likelihood of success of this
claim under a traditional home rule analysis. The analysis below will discuss the possible ways that a
court might rule on this issue. Arizona is a constitutional home rule state, and the claim against the
state’s ban on bag bans based on home rule grounds was styled as an infringement on an area of
local interest. Discussion of the state and local spheres relevant to this issue is therefore warranted.
Further, this Article will take the liberty of projecting what might happen if the same kind of ban
were passed in a legislative home rule state, where determinations of home rule authority depend
more on an assessment of the state action as general legislation. While both analyses will necessarily
vary by state, and by the language of the state and local legislation at issue, Arizona’s example may
provide a helpful demonstration of the barriers that local environmental measures face when
confronted with targeted state action.
1. Constitutional Home Rule

House Enrolled Act No. 1053, State of Indiana, Second Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly (2016)
(amending Section IC 36-1-3-8). Far from being a typical course of action by the state government, the only other
example of this kind of removal of local power in Indiana’s home rule statute is directed at local measures requiring
participation in a Section 8 housing program or similar programs. IC 36-1-3-8; 36-1-3-8.5.
160 W.S.A. § 66.0419 adopted by 2015 A.B. 730.
161 2016 House Bill No. 372.
162 Michigan Public Act 389 (2016).
163 Kuby v. Arizona, CV 2015-011434, Dkt. 1.
164 Id.
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As noted, in states with constitutional home rule provisions, localities are generally granted
authority over all topics of local concern. The determination of whether something is of local
concern is left to the courts, conferring a great deal of power upon the judiciary. Judicial assessment
of the “local” nature of an issue generally comes down to a multi-factored analysis,165 and it is often
difficult to predict whether a court will characterize a particular topic as a matter of state or local
interest.166 Historically, however, courts have given broad constructions to state interests and
narrower interpretations to their local counterparts.
In Arizona, the state constitution establishes the right of cities to frame a charter for their
own government.167 There are nineteen different charter cities in Arizona, each with unique
charters.168 These cities must act according to the powers laid out in their charters; thus, they must
be able to point to specific grants of authority that either directly or impliedly provide authority for
any action taken.169 In general, the charter power includes “all that is necessary or incident to the
government of the municipality[.]”170 Arizona courts have read grants of charter authority to
impliedly include the police power, which can be used to address things like regulation of billboard
lighting171 and fencing requirements.172 In other circumstances, however, such as the tax power,173
courts have found local action improper absent a more specific grant of authority.
“[W]here a home rule city has power by its charter it may act in conformity with such power
not only in matters of local concern, but also in matters of state-wide concern, within its territorial

Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1351
(2009).
166 See Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: the Legal Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home
Rule, 39 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 93, 105 (2005).
167 Ariz. Const. art. XIII, § 2.
168 City of Tucson v. State, 229 Ariz. 172, 174, 273 P.3d 624, 626 (2012).
169 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Allt, 25 Ariz. App. 565, 570, 545 P.2d 76, 81 (1976).
170 City of Tucson v. Walker, 60 Ariz. 232, 238, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (1943).
171 See Whiteco Outdoor Advert. v. City of Tucson, 193 Ariz. 314, 318, 972 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. App. 1998).
172 Arizona Fence Contractors Ass'n v. City of Phoenix Advisory & Appeals Bd., 7 Ariz. App. 129, 131, 436 P.2d 641, 643
(1968).
173 Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Arizona, Inc. v. Riddel, 109 Ariz. 404, 406, 510 P.2d 376, 378 (1973).
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limits,” provided there are no conflicting state rules.174 There appears to be no bright-line test for
establishing whether something is of state or local concern. Instead, courts engage in highly factintensive inquiries, looking at the characteristics of the action and its relative impacts at the state or
local level.175 The state is barred from regulating the conduct of local governments on purely local
issues. Assuming proper authority on the part of the city, however, both cities and states “may
legislate on the same subject when that subject is of local concern or when, though the subject is not
of local concern, the charter or particular state legislation confers on the city express power to
legislate thereon.”176 But where “the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has
appropriated the field by enacting a statute pertaining thereto, that statute governs throughout the
state, and local ordinances contrary thereto are invalid.”177
In the context of the challenge to bag bans as applied in Tempe, there seems to be a good
argument that regulation of bags would be a proper exercise of local power in Arizona. Bag
pollution has a localized impact on environmental health, and cities are granted police powers to
address such issues.178 The state may still, however, be able to regulate in the area if it establishes a
simultaneous state interest. Senate Bill 1241 certainly attempts to do this, stating plainly that “[t]he
regulation of the sale, use and disposition of auxiliary containers is a matter of statewide concern.”179

City of Tucson v. Tucson Sunshine Climate Club, 64 Ariz. 1, 6, 164 P.2d 598, 601 (1945).
Strode v. Sullivan, 72 Ariz. 360, 366, 236 P.2d 48, 52 (1951) (detailing the “court’s views on different fact situations”
with regard to whether the subject matter of a local law “was of local concern or statewide interest.”); see also, e.g., City of
Tucson v. State, 235 Ariz. 434, 440 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding that rules governing local elections are solely of local interest);
City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 214 Ariz. 158, 164 (Ct. App. 2006) (eminent domain is a matter of state interest).
176 City of Tucson v. Rineer, 193 Ariz. 160, 162, 971 P.2d 207, 209 (Ct. App. 1998).
177 Id.
178 See Tempe, Arizona City Charter, available at http://www.tempe.gov/home/showdocument?id=8594 (“The
municipal corporation now existing and known as the ‘City of Tempe’ shall remain and continue to be a body politic and
corporate under the name of the ‘City of Tempe’ with all powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities possible
under the Constitution and general laws of Arizona as fully as though they were specifically enumerated in this Charter,
and all of the powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities granted or to be granted to charter cities and to cities
and towns incorporated under the provisions of Title 9, Arizona Revised Statutes, not in conflict herewith. The
enumeration of the powers, functions, rights, privileges and immunities made in this Charter shall never be construed to
preclude, by implication, or otherwise, the city from doing any and all things not inhibited by the constitution and laws
of Arizona.”).
179 SB 1241.
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175

33

The precise question of whether such regulations, or, more broadly, uniform business or
environmental standards, constitute a state interest has not been decided in Arizona. Given the
general latitude in assessing whether something of state interest, however, it appears likely that
regulation of auxiliary containers would be deemed of state interest, and that the state would be
permitted to override local bans.180 Home rule challenges to the ban on bag bans would therefore
likely be unsuccessful under a traditional analysis that ends at this point.
2. Legislative Home Rule
As noted, Arizona employs a system of constitutional home rule through charter grants. To
make the discussion more nationally applicable, however, this Article will also take the liberty of
extrapolating similar facts to a legislative home rule system to see how local bag bans would fare in
that situation. Generally speaking, in states using legislative grants of home rule authority, that
authority is expressly limited by conflicting general state laws.181 Thus, local authority is permitted
only as long as the state has not issued a contrary statement.182 Any flexibility that courts may have
to preserve local autonomy using flexible interpretations of state and local interests therefore does
not apply in such systems.183 “When a state legislature in a legislative home rule state does expressly
deny localities the power to act in a field, the state denial of local power is conclusive and
successfully preempts the local ordinance, unless that prohibition itself is wrongful.”184

See, e.g., City of Tucson v. State, 957 P.2d 341, 344 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting that, in deciding whether something is of
statewide concern, legislative declarations to that effect are entitled to deference, and that the court must engage in a
balancing test to evaluate whether local or state interests are paramount).
180

See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. X, § 11 (2009) (“A home rule borough or city may exercise all legislative powers not
prohibited by law or by charter.”).
182 Cf. Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 69, Cornell
University Press: Ithaca (2008) (noting that, in Massachusetts, the home rule grant permits cities “to act when the state
legislature has not said [they] cannot act”).
183 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1999) (suggesting
possible ways in which courts can avoid head-to-head conflicts between state and local laws).
184 See Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: the Legal Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home
Rule, 39 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 93, 107 (2005).
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One of the only real limitations on this kind of denial of local power is the prohibition
against special legislation.185 As noted, special legislation is legislation that treats cities, or classes of
cities, within a state differently. Functionally, prohibitions on special legislation have not presented a
great barrier to state action. Generally speaking, “it is not what a law includes that makes it
unconstitutional as a special law, but what it excludes.”186 While states apply a variety of tests, the
formulation generally looks only to whether the law “applies alike to all local governments in terms
and in effect.”187 If that is the case—and even if it is not, where certain exceptions apply188—the
prohibition on special legislation will not block a state’s ability to act. Arizona’s bag ban applies to
all cities and counties in the state; therefore, it is likely to be found to be a general law under a
traditional analysis.189
The analysis for a variety of environmental initiatives by localities would likely look similar to
that for bag bans in both constitutional and statutory home rule states. In consequence, the
narrative to date has been that little can be done in terms of the home rule framework to combat
state measures that target local action.190 The historic deference to state action, and legal ambiguity
of localities, makes it possible for states to chill the experimentation of their local governments on a
number of policy issues. For this reason, conventional wisdom to date appears to have been that
there is little to be done to combat reactive state legislation in the environmental context, at least
within the confines of the home rule analysis.
Richard Briffault & Laurie Reynolds, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 244-46, American Casebook Series,
ThomsonWest (2004).
186 2 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 4:43 (3d ed.)
187 See, e.g., Patrolmen’s Benev. Ass’n of City of New York, Inc. v. New York State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 188 Misc. 2d 146,
151, 728 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d sub nom. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass’n of City of New York Inc. v. City of New York,
285 A.D.2d 52, 729 N.Y.S.2d 789 (2001), aff’d as modified, 97 N.Y.2d 378, 767 N.E.2d 116 (2001).
188 See, e.g., Kelley v. McGee, 57 N.Y.2d 522, 538, 443 N.E.2d 908, 913 (1982) (noting that matters of state concern
constitute an exception to the special legislation bar).
189 See, e.g., Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen’s Found., 637 P.2d 1053, 1061 (1981) (“a law will be general if it applies to
all cases and to all members of the specified class to which the law is made applicable”).
190 See, e.g., Jacob Alderdice, Impeding Local Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7 Harv. L.
& Pol’y Rev. 459, 473 (2013) (noting that the “existing legal structure facing local government currently privileges state,
executive, and business interests over the innovation and spread of urban policy”).
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IV.

Judicial Allocation of State and Local Power
Thus, if the protection of local progressivism from reactive state laws is going to occur, it is

likely to require answers beyond the home rule framework as traditionally applied. That does not
mean, however, that those who wish to advance local environmental policies are necessarily without
recourse. Running parallel to the strict formulations of home rule are a number of cases in which
judges, under a variety of rationales, decide questions of power allocation in favor of the locality.
Where judges are asked to assess actions by a higher level of government that appear designed
principally to eliminate authority at a lower level, they may alter their analysis of state and local
relations to reveal and halt these state goals. This tendency for judges to assume an active role in
allocating authority between state and local has a long history in local government law, dating back
to the debates between Judges Dillon and Cooley. Courts have long been a powerful influence in
determining the proper allocation of state and local authority and how best to interpret the strictures
of home rule in a given situation.191
The willingness of judges in some instances to step outside the more formal, rigid
subordination of the local to the state has been deemed the “shadow doctrine” of local government
law.192 Elements of the Supreme Court’s line of so-called “animus” cases related to the Equal
Protection Clause may form another part of this shadowy element of local government law. Both
kinds of cases, described in greater detail below, have provided bulwarks in some instances against
state incursions on local authority, and they illustrate a longstanding truth about home rule: given the
lack of constitutional language governing the distribution of power between state and local
governments, judge-made doctrine and assumptions play a sizable role in the final outcome of home
Cf. Neil Littlefield, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 18, Buffalo: William S. Hein &
Co., Inc. (1985) (“The doctrine of an exclusive power of a city with respect to its municipal affairs is entirely a judicial
invention in aid of the underlying principles of municipal home rule having no basis in the constitutional language of
most home rule provisions.”).
192 Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 Buff. L.
Rev. 393, 408 (2002).
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rule determinations. Neither the “shadow doctrine” as it currently stands, nor the equal protection
doctrine, are likely to be easily applied in the environmental context. But their ability to preserve
local policymaking may point to other means of forging a path forward. To the extent that
applicable substantive protections can be found, courts may be empowered to push back against
reactive state action in the face of local environmental policymaking.
A. The “Shadow Doctrine” of Local Government Law
In discussing the legacy of Dillon’s Rule and the modern realities of home rule, a number of
scholars have made the case that there exists a protected sphere of judicially recognized local
authority. While this sphere is bound by no explicit rules, its presence has nonetheless been posited
as an explanation for why certain cases come out differently in the home rule framework. Courts
may decide conflicts in favor of localities under this “shadow doctrine” of local government law
where they are motivated to find “that communities should be empowered to choose policies
consonant with local values.”193 Thus, in fields such as zoning, land use, and school financing and
districting, courts have often upheld local authority against intrusions by the state.194
While these cases point to a means by which judges have elected to escape the strict
outcomes of the home rule analysis, they are unlikely to apply well to environmental law cases across
the board. Although land use and zoning have been recognized as matters predominantly of local
authority, the same kinds of cases do not appear to exist more generally for environmental law.
That result is perhaps not unusual; as noted, many environmental issues and impacts bleed beyond
local boundaries. Thus, unlike some fields involving entirely local impacts,195 the opposite principles

Id. at 409.
Id.; Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on “Monarchism” to Modern
Localism, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 74, 99 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—the Structure of Local Government Law, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1990).
195 See, e.g., Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 51, 69 (1989) (critiquing California’s
overturning of local criminal policies on implied preemption grounds and noting that “nearly every significant aspect of
criminal law enforcement reflects a norm [of] decentralization.”)
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are often in play in the environmental context, where there has long been a push toward lawmaking
at increasingly higher levels of government. An argument could, of course, be advanced for looking
at environmental issues on a case by case basis. But without a principle as to why local laws should
govern on such topics, and without a more specific grounding principle, environmental law as a
uniquely local endeavor is a hard case to make. In consequence, while the “shadow doctrine” may
provide an exception to the home rule analysis for certain kinds of cases, it is unlikely to offer any
particular relief in the bag ban example, or in other kinds of reactive, targeted state legislation aimed
at local environmental measures.
B. Federal Constitutional Provisions
Another example of local government-friendly outcomes in assessing state and local
conflicts comes from a series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court. These cases have
considered scenarios that, like bans on bag bans, are targeted state removals of local authority to
carry out what might be characterized as progressive policies. In these cases, the Court has
questioned states’ ability to eliminate local power to enact laws that advance the individual liberties
of citizens. The analysis in these cases has not proceeded along the lines of typical equal protection
doctrine analysis. While many explanations for this deviation have been proffered, one that a
number of scholars have adopted is a view of the animus cases as a protection of local
experimentation, a desire to weed out state behavior motivated by animus, or both.196
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects against state
legislation that improperly creates classes of persons and treats like classes differently. At the core
of the Clause’s protections is an insistence that “government classifications be both rational and free

David Barron, Traces of Local Constitutionalism; Lawrence Rosenthal, Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local
Government Law; William D. Araiza; Marc Poirier.
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of illegitimate motivations such as simple dislike of the burdened group.”197 The Equal Protection
Clause vindicates individual rights, not rights of geographic areas or communities.198 However,
those “[i]ndividual rights in the Constitution constrain state power over municipalities.”199 Thus, “if
a state violates the constitutional rights of individuals, the fact that it does so by changing municipal
powers . . . does not insulate it from suit.”200 Equal protection doctrine therefore provides an
additional layer of consideration to the typical home rule analysis. In addition to the factors already
discussed, the state cannot make changes to local powers that violate the constitutional rights of its
citizens.201
The Supreme Court made this point explicit in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In
Romer, the Supreme Court considered another reaction at the state level against local progressivism.
In the early 1990s, several cities in Colorado passed laws banning discrimination based on sexual
orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services,
and other transactions and activities. In response, voters in Colorado adopted by referendum
Amendment 2, which “prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or
local government designed to protect the named class”—that is, “homosexual persons or gays and
lesbians.”202 The Romer plaintiffs challenged Amendment 2 as unconstitutional on equal protection

William D. Araiza, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CONGRESSIONAL POWER, JUDICIAL DOCTRINE,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (NYU Univ. Press 2015).
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201 See, e.g., Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
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grounds. Colorado state courts found that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny because it
infringed the fundamental rights of those affected, and therefore enjoined its enforcement.203 The
case then came before the Supreme Court.
The Court’s equal protection analysis typically looks first to the persons affected by the
challenged action. If the affected persons are part of a protected class, the Court will apply strict
scrutiny to the law; if they are not, then the Court will look only for whether there is a rational basis
for the legislation.204 The Romer Court did not find that the affected groups constituted a protected
class. Nor did it engage in traditional rational basis review, which would have provided for
substantial deference to be given to the state’s proffered explanation for the legislation. Instead, it
engaged in what it called rational basis review of the Amendment, but found that, because the law
was rooted in legislative animus, it was not supported by a rational basis.205 Finding no “identifiable
legitimate purpose or discrete objective” to the law other than discrimination against a certain class,
the Court deemed it impermissible class legislation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.206
Thus, the Romer Court did not apply a traditional suspect class formulation to the question of
whether Amendment 2 was permissible. Instead, it employed a rational basis analysis, and found
that animus on the part of the legislature cannot form a rational basis for a law. In this way, the case
represented a step outside the traditional deference afforded legislatures under the rational basis
framework, and offered a means by which the Court could peer behind the law to more closely
examine its motivations. The perception of animus on the part of the state in Romer appears to have
been the driving factor in this analysis; the same could potentially also be said of United States

Id. at 626.
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Department of Agriculture v. Moreno207 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.208 Together, these
cases provide a foundation for the Court’s “anti-animus metholology” that was expanded in
Windsor.209 The foundation of such an anti-animus bent is “that just as individuals have a moral and
sometimes legal duty not to act maliciously toward others, the group of people elected as
representatives . . . has a moral and sometimes constitutional duty not to act maliciously toward a
person or group of people.210 Therefore, “legislation must have some substantial justification
beyond ‘we don’t like you,’ ‘we couldn’t care less about you, or ‘we just want it that way.’”211 Viewed
through this lens, the animus cases focus more on “legislative process than [on] legislative results;”
they do not declare a fundamental right to certain benefits, but disallow legislative process motivated
by a desire to harm a disadvantaged group.212 Of course, critics of the animus cases may characterize
these opinions as impermissible judicial determination of substantive policy that overrides popular
will. In this light, the willingness to step outside the bounds of traditional rational basis review and
peer behind the curtain to examine legislative motivations is outcome-driven and outcomedeterminative. Nevertheless, the animus cases have made clear the impermissibility of legislation
that has as its primary purpose the infliction of injury or indignity.213 In the same way as the special
legislation doctrine protects against the singling out of particular cities for favorable or unfavorable

413 U.S. 528 (1973). At issue in Moreno was the exclusion from the federal Food Stamp Act of any household that
contained a person not related to another person in the household. Id. at 529. In examining the rationale for the
exclusion, the Court found that it had been enacted to prevent the participation of “hippies” or those in “hippie
communes.” Id. at 534. The Court concluded that “a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate government interest,” id., and that the exclusion therefore lacked a rational basis. Id. at
538.
208 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In Cleburne, the Court considered the denial of a special use permit for the operation of a group
home for the mentally retarded. Id. at 435. The Court rejected a formulation that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect
class, id. at 442-47, but nevertheless found the denial improper because it lacked a rational basis and was motivated
instead by “negative attitudes” and “fear.” Id. at 448-50.
209 Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 183, 204-05 (2014) (describing Romer,
Moreno, and City of Cleburne as the “animus precedents,” and quoting Cass Sunstein as calling them a “trilogy”).
210 Id. at 185 (emphasis in original).
211 Id. at 230.
212 Id. at 230-31.
213 Id. at 243.
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treatment, the Equal Protection clause protects against such singling out of individuals.214 Thus, the
“core antianimus requirement” of the Equal Protection Clause215 provides a check on state action
outside of the home rule framework.
Several scholars have drawn a more explicit connection between the animus cases and home
rule. Romer, Windsor, and others have been characterized as containing “whiffs of federalism,”216
“traces of local constitutionalism,”217 or, more explicitly, a prohibition on state preemption of
unpopular local political processes.218 While theories of these decisions as having an element of
localism vary, the arguments boil down to a rejection of a higher level of government’s interference
with policy experimentation that will further the rights of citizens at a lower level.219 This processbased explanation means that the cases establish no substantive guarantees of benefits, but simply
force the federal or state government to “back off of . . . particular intrusion[s].”220 This kind of
support of local constitutional enforcement may uphold parochial policies as well as progressive

William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection Cases, 34 Ecology L.Q. 493, 504 (2007).
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935 (2014).
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ones.221 But it also ensures that “states may not preclude their local political institutions from
promoting a norm of constitutional equality that lies beyond direct judicial enforcement.”222
These cases therefore provide several different ways to think about and challenge state
action that burdens the ability of localities to protect the constitutional rights of their citizens.223 The
added layer of protection against state incursion on local authority is unlikely to come into play with
regard to bag bans or other environmental issues, however. To be sure, targeted laws at the state
level that bar certain local actions may be motivated by animus or industry interests.224 As in many
other areas, local regulations on environmental issues such as plastic bag bans are likely to pique the
interest of industries that may be affected by the regulation,225 and encourage those industries to seek
redress at the state level.226 In these fights, localities often lose out to special interests at the state
level, as they have much weaker relative lobbying influence.227 But while environmental harms
endanger humans,228 restrictions on environmental protections do not touch on recognized
individual liberties. Any inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, even under the slightly modified
animus analysis, will require definition of the burdened group, and the rights being burdened.
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Carving out a special class of persons is difficult in the environmental context, where there is not a
class of persons being singled out. Instead, the harm is acted upon a natural resource,229 or, viewed
another way, on the right of citizens to develop policy solutions for a particular problem.230 In
consequence, claims invoking the federal Equal Protection Clause to guard against state revocation
of local authority to act on environmental issues would likely be rejected before any kind of analysis
of state animus could be reached. Thus, while the Equal Protection Clause provides some avenues
around the home rule analysis, it is likely to be difficult to apply in the context of local
environmental laws.
C. State Environmental Protections
Both the “shadow doctrine” of local government law and the animus line of cases and their
possibly localist underpinnings illustrate the ways in which judges are involved in sorting out state
and local power. They also provide a good example of how judges react when uncomfortable with
the result of the typical division of power. To date, similar kinds of reasoning have not occurred in
the environmental law context. Both courts and scholars have been stymied in combatting the
targeted preemption of local environmental efforts by the seemingly implacable nature of the
distribution of state and local power.231 The kinds of reactive state legislation currently being seen,
however, may offer an impetus for judges to examine more carefully possible bases for protection of
a local right to innovate in support of environmental protections. Outside of the home rule context,

Equal protection claims focused on harm to resources have been discussed, but have a low likelihood of success. See,
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scholars have recognized that where state constitutions establish a right to a clean environment, state
ability to forestall local action on an environmental issue may be called into question.232 And even
where state constitutional protections do not exist, it has been suggested that the public trust
doctrine could potentially be used as a kind of canon of construction in interpreting state action,
thereby providing a basis for environmental protection, or at least a barrier to environmental
degradation.233
The goal of the discussion below is to incorporate these ideas into the realm of state and
local government relations. Again using bans on bag bans as an example, it argues that state
constitutional protections and the public trust doctrine may provide justification for judicial support
of local innovation on environmental protection. Home rule precedent leaves open the door for
judges to construe state power liberally, and nothing proposed herein is likely to provide absolute
support for local autonomy. But there may also be a path open to judges who, confronted with
reactive, targeted incursions on local solutions, see fit to infuse the traditional analysis of state action
with layers of environmental protection. To the extent they exist, state constitutional provisions
may provide a basis for finding state laws improper at the outset. And even where such provisions
are not as straightforward or easily applied, permutations of the public trust doctrine may establish a
basis for courts to bring a more environmentally friendly home rule analysis out of the shadows.
1. State Constitutional Provisions
A number of state constitutions include provisions that establish environmental protections
for their citizens. These provisions vary widely in form and scope, and, like home rule provisions,
their precise number and parameters are difficult to assess.234 In general, these provisions do not
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 385, 438 (1997).
233 See William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 693, 703 (2012).
234 See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 385, 439 (1997) (“approximately twothirds of state constitutions . . . speak in some way to environmental concerns”); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental
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impose affirmative duties on a state,235 but establish limits on government action.236 Where these
protections exist, the home rule analysis may be fairly simple. Under either a constitutional or
legislative home rule framework—or whether looking for a state interest or general legislation—state
actions may not contravene the constitution. A constitutional right to a clean environment, or
whatever form the provision may take, therefore provides an extra layer of protection for local
action in support of that right.
This kind of protection was responsible for the result in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
2013 decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth.237 At issue in that case was state legislation on
natural gas drilling that included a clause explicitly preempting all local ordinances governing such
drilling. In considering challenges to the state law, the court engaged in a thorough discussion of
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, which states that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.238
The court recognized that localities had no inherent powers, and that the Commonwealth had the
authority to alter or remove power granted to local governments.239 But it also acknowledged that
“constitutional commands regarding municipalities’ obligations and duties to their citizens cannot be
abrogated by statute.”240 The court found that the state scheme of voiding all local regulations
Policy and State Constitutions: the Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 Rutgers L.J. 863, 867 (1996) (“Virtually all state
constitutions contain one or more provisions specifying environmental or natural resource policies; most include
multiple provisions”).
235 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: the Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 Rutgers
L.J. 863, 896 (1996) (“state courts have never ordered a legislature to adopt a particular environmental policy or program
based on an environmental policy provision, even in those states where the constitution appears to mandate legislative
action”).
236 See William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine,
and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 385, 446 (1997).
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regarding fracking, and instead requiring local governments to take measures to accommodate
fracking as needed, forced localities to act in contravention of the constitutional mandate. It further
stated that “[t]he [state] police power, broad as it may be, does not encompass [the] authority to . . .
fundamentally disrupt . . . expectations respecting the environment.”241 Thus, the portion of the
state legislation preempting local lawmaking was found to be improper.
In the same way, a constitutional provision protecting a right to a clean environment could
support a locality’s power to develop initiatives—such as bans on bag bans—in support of that
right. And a ban on the ability of localities to combat pollution might be seen as a constitutional
violation by the state.242 While these provisions would not impose any kind of affirmative obligation
on the part of the state, they could potentially protect the right to local policymaking in support of
trust resources. Regardless of whether a state has a legislative or constitutional home rule system, or
even a home rule system at all, state laws may not contravene the state constitution. As seen in
Robinson Township, and, to some degree in Romer and Windsor, state limits on local experimentation in
support of a constitutional goal may be found to be unconstitutional. If so, there would be no need
to address the home rule framework. Under such an analysis, state bans on bag bans would fail as a
matter of constitutional law.

Id. at 978.
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2. Public Trust Doctrine
Of course, not all state constitutions incorporate explicit protections of environmental
values. Even where these textual protections do not exist, however,243 there may be a path forward
for courts to uphold local environmental innovation in the face of contrary state authority. The
public trust doctrine is a much-discussed concept that may allow judges to push back on actions by
the state that undermine environmental values.244 Both the precise scope and the legal foundation of
the doctrine are still very much in flux, and heavily debated.245 In short, however, the concept of the
public trust stands for the principle that certain environmental and natural resources are held in trust
for citizens by the government. The principal trustee of those resources is the state legislature,246
although trust responsibilities may in some states be delegated to local governments. Originally
focused on aquatic resources, the more modern public trust doctrine has proven itself to be much
more amphibious, and has been applied to a wider range of natural assets.
Like the legal status of local government, the public trust doctrine is a creation largely of the
judiciary.247 Its more modern use is often tied to Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, an 1892 case in
which the Supreme Court confirmed “that the historic public trust doctrine was an independent
limitation on the state’s power to sell or otherwise relinquish control over submerged lands that
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instead must always be held ‘in trust’ for the public.”248 Following that case, and after the more
recent revival of the doctrine by Professor Joseph Sax’s seminal 1970 law review article on the
subject,249 “courts have decided hundreds of cases involving the public trust doctrine.”250 Its legal
foundations remain unsettled, however, and the doctrine has long been subject to debate as to how
far its limits extend, and how and when it should be applied.251 Indeed, the popularity of the
doctrine among environmental advocates may be due in large part to its malleability.252 What many
theories regarding the public trust have in common, however, is the recognition of a duty on the
part of the state to “manage trust resources for the public benefit” and to “consider the public trust
before taking action that may adversely affect trust resources.”253
At the outset, it should be noted that in states with well-defined, enforceable public trust
doctrines that expand beyond the traditional scope of navigable waters, an analysis could potentially
proceed in much the same way as it would in the instance of constitutional protections. That is, a
party could potentially challenge a state law as violative of the public trust doctrine; under either a
constitutional or legislative home rule framework, an invalid state law would not override local
lawmaking abilities. It seems more likely, however, given the lack of concrete public trust principles,
that its more helpful and proper use in many states is as an aid in understanding competing state and
local authority in the home rule system. This conception of the public trust may leave open the
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707 (2006).
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ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2d ed.) 3-10, Carolina Academic Press (2015); Richard J. Lazarus,
Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631
(1986).
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possibility for a judge to overturn reactive state legislation that eliminates local ability to advance
environmental values.
Scholars have advanced a range of proposals for how the public trust obligation might
manifest itself. These proposals run the gamut from calls for the public trust to impose an
affirmative duty on the state, to those viewing the public trust as more of a background principle of
property law. Operating at the latter end of that spectrum, Professor William Araiza has suggested a
means by which the public trust doctrine might move beyond its historic aquatic underpinnings
while circumventing criticism that such an expansion lacks doctrinal foundation and inappropriately
upsets the separation of powers between branches.254 Professor Araiza suggests that the public trust
doctrine may be available to judges not as a doctrine with legally binding effects, but as a canon of
construction, or a “background principle against which positive legislation and administrative actions
are construed and reviewed.”255 Under this theory, courts could construe state legislative action that
threatened values of the public trust “against the backdrop of a commitment to the protection of
those values.”256
As noted, courts in a number of cases have, where motivated by principles that support local
control of an issue, created a sort of “shadow doctrine” upholding local authority in the face of state
assertions of control. 257 It is difficult—and, as noted, contrary to much of environmental law and
advocacy—to advance an argument that localities deserve deference in general for environmental
policymaking. The use of the public trust doctrine as an interpretive mechanism may, however,
offer support of localities where state action would undermine or run contrary to advancement of
the public trust. Under such a theory, the public trust doctrine would not itself alter the home rule
See generally William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 693, 697 (2012).
Id. at 697.
256 Id. at 714.
257 Gerald E. Frug, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 51, Princeton University
Press: Princeton (1999) (“the immunization of city decision making from state control is possible only if courts have a
strong sense that the local values being advanced outweigh [those of the state]”).
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analysis. Instead, it could provide a basis for a judicial finding of protected local values in need of
vindication. Targeted elimination of local authority unaccompanied by action at the state level
creates obstacles to action on environmental issues and impedes actions in furtherance of the trust
resources of the state. Courts reviewing state action that invalidates local ability to act on
environmental matters may find that public trust principles support a right to local innovation on
such issues. This kind of application of the public trust doctrine would not dictate a substantive
outcome, or require affirmative action by the state. But it would find that public trust principles
operate as a check on state authority, and that a state cannot put up a wall against advancement of
public trust values by localities.
The suggested use of the public trust in this manner does not yet appear to have been
applied; nevertheless, courts may be able to “act creatively” to vindicate public trust principles.258
Taking Arizona’s treatment of bag bans again as a case study, this Article will make a first attempt at
envisioning what this kind of approach would look like. Arizona recognizes the public trust
doctrine,259 and the scope of that doctrine is determined by the judiciary.260 Most formally, the
public trust doctrine in Arizona “restricts the sovereign’s ability to dispose of resources held in
public trust.”261 Arizona courts have expressly stated, however, that the public trust is not
necessarily limited to a state’s traditional interest in land under water.262 It is possible, therefore, to
consider how the public trust may come into play where the state legislature attempts to halt local
environmental efforts.
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As noted, where a state bans local ability to ban bag bans, or to impose fees on bags, the
analysis of whether this elimination of local authority was in line with the state’s home rule
delegation would typically look only to whether the ban was a general law, or was one impacting
state concern. Under either analysis, the ban would likely be upheld. Where the public trust
doctrine acts as a “thumb on the scale in favor of the public trust value,”263 however, the outcome
could potentially be different. By incorporating public trust values into the home rule framework,
courts may have a legitimate role in balancing politics between city and state, and maintaining
environmental protection as the constant. In this way, the use of the doctrine is consistent with
Joseph Sax’s original statement that “public trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards
for dealing with the public domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived
imperfections in the legislative and administrative process.”264
This approach may be vulnerable to the same kinds of critiques that have long been aimed at
expansions of the public trust doctrine beyond its historic roots. For instance, the public trust is
often criticized as a countermajoritarian measure by courts overriding the will of the people, or as a
judge-made doctrine lacking in legal foundation. But where, as in the approach suggested here,
judges are merely weighing whether one branch of government should have the ability to put an end
to experimentation by another, concerns about override of the popular will may be less substantial.
And while it is perhaps not a satisfying answer to critics of the legitimacy of the public trust’s
foundations to say that the use of the public trust doctrine in this capacity is merely another example
of judicial willingness to uphold local authority in certain instances, it is nonetheless true. Upholding
local experimentation in support of the environmental resources of citizens is in keeping with the
Id. at 719.
See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471,
509 (1970). Notably, Professor Sax thought that one of these imperfections was decisionmaking at too local a level in
matters of statewide concern. But Sax’s general idea that the public trust doctrine serves to correct for imbalances that
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long tradition of the judiciary sorting out the extent of the power of the state; the ideas surrounding
the public trust provide a reasoned basis on which that tradition may continue in environmental law.
A. Constitutional Home Rule
As discussed, Arizona’s home rule system is based on a constitutional grant of authority.
The validity of any state law’s infringement on local authority under a constitutional home rule
framework is likely to turn on whether the subject of the law in question is of “genuine state
concern.” 265 If it is, the law is likely to be upheld. Courts tend to give a liberal construction to what
constitutes a “genuine state concern,” and often allow state laws to override local lawmaking. Thus,
for instance, Arizona courts could find that the question of how best to conduct pollution control,
or creation of uniform business standards, is a matter of statewide concern.266 If that is the case,
then a ban on bag bans would be an appropriate subject for state legislation and the state statute
would be upheld. While the extent to which state and local provisions conflict is often a subject of
rich debate, in this example of the ban on bag bans, there is no question—local prohibition on bags
directly conflicts with the state revocation of authority. And in that circumstance, the state law
prevails.267 Local bag bans would therefore be invalidated.
The public trust doctrine could, however, potentially act as a “thumb on the scale” in favor
of local authority that is generally absent from this analysis.268 The need for uniform business
regulations, and mere state assertions of this interest, would likely be sufficient in a typical analysis to
support a finding of the validity of the state statute. Bringing in the public trust doctrine, however,
both the state and local governments also have a genuine interest in the furtherance of values of the
public trust. Those values cannot be abrogated by or rejected in favor of competing interests. A
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judge assessing whether the state deserves deference in the question of how best to conduct
pollution control may view that question differently where the state is under an obligation to uphold
public trust values. Viewing the public trust as a canon that counsels against the undermining of
trust resources, a court could decide to give more weight to the outcome that would not do so. A
judge reviewing the state statute could potentially find that there is no genuine state interest in action
that would undermine the trust, or that would prevent localities from policy experimentation that
would advance their interest in preserving and maintaining trust resources.
Without public trust principles, or a reason to uphold local action, such a finding is unlikely;
with them, judges may find a legal basis on which to premise a decision in support of local authority.
Such a construction would allow for emphasis on the local interest in maintaining the quality of local
waterways and surrounding lands, and avoid state elimination of the ability to advance that
preservation that was unaccompanied by state action on the issue. In this way, the home rule
doctrine itself could be infused with public trust, or environmental protection, principles. Nothing
in this analysis would create an affirmative obligation on the part of the state to take action to
prevent pollution of the resources at issue here—in the bag ban context, state land and waterways.
It may, however, prevent targeted removals by the state of a locality’s ability to uphold the
environmental interests of its citizens.
This proposal and analysis is admittedly general, and open to many kinds of ad hoc
determinations. That unbounded analysis is characteristic of both the home rule and public trust
doctrines. Judges have substantial leeway in defining cognizable state interests, and in allocating
power between state and local governments. The principles behind the public trust doctrine could
similarly play a background role in justifying the judiciary’s action in halting state legislation that
targets local authority. That could make a critical distinction in the way that courts think about local
authority, and may provide an avenue for expression of judicial skepticism about state action that
54

undermines environmental values or that is motivated by animus toward a set of progressive
policies. In this way, it could provide a way out from otherwise potentially inescapable deference to
state authority in instances of explicit removal of local authority over environmental issues. The
approach set out here would likely not apply where the state itself has advanced a competing
regulatory system for handling an environmental issue; it also would not support local authority on
parochial policies that undermine public trust values. The doctrine’s use here would instead be in
highlighting the legal significance of state elimination of the opportunity for progress in support of
environmental goals. While the vagueness of this theory means that the analysis employed would
necessarily vary by state, it also means that it is broad enough to encompass many sets of
circumstances.269
B. Legislative Home Rule
The public trust as modifier of what constitutes a genuine state concern is unlikely to have
an impact for cities operating under grants of legislative home rule. For these cities, the operative
question is instead whether or not the state law at issue constitutes general legislation. If so, it may
be upheld without employing any analysis of the state interest involved. The public trust doctrine
may have a role to play in the determination of general versus special legislation as well.
Typically, as noted, a general law is simply defined as one that impacts all cities within a class equally.
Infusing this analysis with public trust principles may create an opportunity for a different outcome
in the case of environmental goals undermined by state action.
In Cleveland v. State, an Ohio Court of Appeals considered a challenge by a city to the
constitutionality of a state statute disallowing municipal bans on certain foods such as transfats.270
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Ohio appears to have one of the most precise definitions in the country regarding what constitutes a
general law, and employs a four-part test. As part of the court’s assessment of the validity of the
state statute, one of the factors it had to consider was whether the state ban had uniform application
throughout the state.271 The statute in question applied on its face to all parts of the state, but
addressed only food service operations and not retail food establishments. The difference in
coverage led the court to find that the law did not have uniform application. While the court
decided the question of uniformity on that basis, it also described an argument from amici
participants that “any state law which prevents individual municipalities from acting to address food
based health disparities resulting from local social, demographic, environmental and geographic
attributes inevitably impacts different parts of the state in a non-uniform manner.”272 The parties
did not address this issue, and it did not form the basis of the court’s decision, but the court
nevertheless “f[ound] some merit in this argument.”273
The public trust doctrine may be able to encourage a similar kind of analysis even in states
that do not employ Ohio’s test for general legislation. Under a typical analysis, a court’s
determination of whether something constitutes a general law is limited to identifying the class to
which the law applies, and assessing whether the application is uniform within the class. As in
Cleveland, the exemption of a large category of actors may prevent a finding of uniform application.
But where, as in the case of Arizona’s ban on bag bans, the law applies to all cities and counties in
the state, the law on its face is likely to be found uniform. If the state and local governments are
viewed through the lens of being holders of the public trust, however, the disparate impacts of state
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prohibitions on local action may come into greater relief. Removal of local authority to advance the
environmental needs of their communities, without action on the state level to address those needs,
means that some local governments will be able to uphold their public trust obligations while others
will not. Such a law therefore disadvantages cities who are attempting to protect trust resources
through bag bans; it may also be viewed as conferring a special advantage in terms of advancing
public trust values upon those localities who may be in less need of such a ban.274 While the public
trust doctrine is unlikely to create affirmative obligations with regard to environmental protections, it
may help to give the lie to purportedly uniform actions by the state that instead target actions by
certain cities. In this way, the public trust doctrine may empower courts to push back against
reactive state legislation.
V.

Conclusion
As noted, the home rule system took a variety of forms as it spread across the nation. At its

core, though, is recognition that piecemeal local governance undermines the ability of cities to
respond to the needs of their citizens. Targeted state removal of local authority to act to protect the
environment undermines democratic ideals and prevents useful experimentation.275 It also has the
potential to reduce participation in local government, as citizens feel that their choices are not
valued.276 In this way, state revocation of local authority may “not only preven[t] cities from
experimenting in democratic forms of organization,” but may “make experiments seem less
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appealing.”277 There is important environmental work currently being done by cities, and a great
need for that work to continue into the future. The ability of states to remove the authority to act
on issues at the city level while perpetuating inaction at the state level is therefore concerning.
It is not the intent of this Article to send to the courts what is more properly the job of the
legislature. The public trust doctrine or other judge-made doctrines should not be a substitute for
the hard work of governance and creating good rules at the legislative level.278 An approach more
desirable than the one proposed here may be for state legislatures to amend home rule provisions to
prevent reactionary revocation of local authority by the state legislature.279 By carving out a more
certain piece of authority for localities, states could help prepare their communities for the coming
decades in which cities are likely to confront a new set of environmental issues. Until that occurs,
however,280 upholding local ability to act will likely be the purview of the courts. It is easy for
environmental issues to be undervalued in the political process,281 and for movement on those issues
to be undermined by the state legislature. There is likely something of folly in suggesting that the
same legislatures seen to be undermining environmental values make changes that would curtail their
authority over local action, and there is a real potential for harm to environmental progress to be
done if courts take no action in support of cities.
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There may of course be other ways for localities and private parties to achieve environmental
progress within the constraints of home rule. On the plastic bag front, retailers could choose not to
stock plastic bags, or to offer incentives to customers for using reusable containers. For instance,
Whole Foods stores give customers a 10 cent credit for each reusable bag brought for grocery
shopping. More generally, it has been suggested that cities may also be able to incorporate existing
state environmental protections instead of fashioning their own restrictions on use,282 or to employ
Business Improvement Districts or other special districts that are outside the reach of traditional
home rule laws. These options do not, however, get at the heart of the question of when and how
state lawmakers may strike down local environmental legislation. State constitutional protections,
and the public trust doctrine, could justify a clearer judicial doctrine on state removal of local
authority on environmental issues.
To be sure, local power over environmental issues is not an unalloyed good.283 Cities, or
neighborhoods, may act in parochial ways that prevent progress on environmental topics.284 In the
past, however, cities have experimented with governance in ways that have eventually created
positive change at the state and national level.285 In this way, “[c]ities have served and might again
serve as vehicles for the achievement of purposes that have been frustrated in modern American
life,” and might provide the ability “to participate actively in the basic societal decisions that affect
one’s life.”286 It is the hope of many that they can play the same role in responding to a number of
pressing environmental needs.287 The home rule framework was designed to ensure that cities would
have the ability to respond to their rapidly changing needs; by infusing home rule with an updated
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understanding of government obligations toward the environment, it may be brought a bit closer to
achieving that goal.
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